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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

-v-

Case No. 18051

.

MICHAEL GEORGE DURANT,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Michael George Durant, appeals from
the conviction and judgment of Aggravated Arson, a felony in
the second degree, in violation of Utah Code Ann.,

§

76-6-103

(1953), as amended.
DISPOSITIO~

IN THE LOWER COURT

The appellant was tried and convicted in a bench
trial of Aggravated Arson, a felony in the second degree, in
the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake
County,. State of Utah, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge,
presiding.

The appellant was sentenced to an indeterminate

term not to exceed five years, the judge having lowered the
penalty to the next lowest category, pursuant to Utah Code
Ann.,

§

76-3-402 (1953), as amended.
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RELIRF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

The respondent seeks an order of this Court
affirming the verdict and findings of the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The respondent essentially adopts the facts as
presented by the appellant with one exception.

The appellant

alludes to the "appellant anrl the owner" residing in the house
which was burned.

While testimony found on page 19 of the

trial transcript (page 48 of the record of this case)
indicates that Carl Rose "had the lease" or "rental" to the
house, such indicates that he was a tenant in the house and
did not own the property.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED
ARSON WAS PROPER.

The statute under which the appellant was convicted,
Utah Code Ann.,

§

76-6-103 (1953), as amended, provides:

(1) A person is guilty of aggravated arson
if by means of fire or explosives he
intentionally and unlawfully damages:
(a) A habitable structure: or
(b) Any structure or vehicle when any
person not a participant in the offense is
in the structure or vehicle.
(2) Aggravated arson is a felony of the
second degree.
-2-
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Under the terms of the statute, the burning of any habitable
structure or any structure or vehicle where another person is
in that structure or vehicle is proscribed, regardless of the
ownership of the structure or vehicle.

It having been proved

that the house burned in the instant case was a "habitable
structure," the appellant and Carl Rose being residents
thereof, and that the appellant burned the house, the
appellant's conviction under the above statute was proper.
The appellant claims that in burning down the house,
he was acting as an agent of Carl Rose, whom it is posited was
the "owner" of the house.

According to the appellant, an

agent may not be guilty of a crime of which the principal
could not have been found guilty.

Here, the appellant states,

since the principal, Carl Rose, as "owner" of the property,
could not have been

proper~y

convicted of Aggravated Arson,

neither could his agent, the appellant, be properly found
guilty of the crime.
The appellant reaches the conclusion that the common
law rule that a person may not be guilty of Arson by burning
his own property extends to the statutory crime of Aggravated
Arson through a creative twisting of the m~aning of the word
"unlawful" in both the Aggravated Arson statute, set out
supra, and in the Arson statute, Utah Code Ann., S 76-6-102
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(1953), as amended.I

That statute provides, in pertinent

part:
(1) A person is guilty of arson if, under
circumstances not amounting to aggravated
arson, by means of fire or explosives, he
unlawfully and intentionally damages:
(a) Any property with intention of
defrauding an insurer; or
(b) The property of another.
The appellant asserts that since the term "unlawful" is not
statutorily defined, it must be defined here in the terms of
the other elements of the crime of arson.

In other words, the

"unlawful" conduct proscribed in the Arson statute must be
either the burning of any property with the intention of
insurance fraud or the burning of the property of another.
Since there was no proof of insurance fraud in the instant
case, the appellant posits that the definition of "unlawful"
conduct under the Arson statute must, by default, be the
burning of the property of

~another.

Here, then, the appellant

asserts that the definition of "unlawful" in the Arson statute
must be "the burning of the property of another."
The appellant's argument is next dependent on
incorporating the definition of "unlawful" reached under the

lunder Utah Code Ann., § 76-1-105 (1953), as
amended, common law crimes are abolished. so, too,
presumably, are common law defenses. Thus, in order to assert
the defense that an owner of property cannot be guilty of
arson by burning it, the defendant must assert a statutory
defense to the statutory crime.
-4-
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above analysis of the Arson statute into the Aggravated Arson
statute, where •unlawful" damage is a necessary element of the
crime.

Accoroing to the appellant, if an "unlawful" act means

"the burning of the property of another" (in the Arson
statute), and the Aggravated Arson statute includes as an
element the "unlawful" damage, by fire or explosives, of a
habitable structure or an inhabited structure or vehicle, then
by definition the burned habitable structure or inhabited

structure or vehicle must be the property of someone other
than the actor in order for the actor to be guilty of
Aggravated Arson.

Thus, since Carl Rose was purportedly the

"owner" of the burned property and the appellant his "agent,"
the argument goes, neither can be found guilty of Aggravated
Arson.
The appellant's theory is meritless for several
:

reasons.

First, the appellant's assertion that since the word

"unlawful" is not statutorily defined, it must take its
/

meaning from the other elements of the crime (of arson) is
ludicrous.

Taken to its logical conclusion, the appellant's

argument would render the word "unlawful" useless surplusage
in each statute in which it appears, an interpretation which
stretches the imagination in light of the overwhelming number
of statutes in which the requirement that the act be
"unlawful" is enumerated as a separate element.

It is

illogical that the Legislature would, through use of the word
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"unlawful," set forth a separate element of a crime that would
essentially be identical to the other elements of the crime.
Indeed, the word "unlawful" would take on a different meaning
in each s ta tu te in which it is used.

Su ch would be an

unnecessary repetition of the statutory elements, would add
nothing, and make no sense.
Clearly, the statutory meaning of the word
"unlawful" must be drawn from some other source than the
statute in which it appears.

The logical rendering of the

word's statutory meaning is "without justification," the word
"justification" drawing its meaning from Part Four of Chapter
Two of Title 76 of the Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended,
which includes within its ambit numerous justifications which
exclude criminal responsibility; the defense of persons or
property, an actor's reasonable actions in fulfillment of
governmental duties, reasonable discipline of minors by
parents, guardians, teachers, or others in loco parentis,
reasonable discipline of persons in lawful custody, and other
justifications.2

While respondent recognizes that this

2The requirement that the act committed be
"unlawful" in order for it to be criminal is found in the
statutes outlawing Mayhem, Utah Code Ann., S 76-5-105 (1953),
as amended; Criminal Homicide, Utah Code Ann., § 76-5-201
(1953), as amended; Criminal Mischief, Utah Code Ann.,
§ 76-6-106(2) (1953), as amended; and Robbery, Utah Code Ann.,
§ 76-6-301 (1953), as amended, without any statutory
definition of the word "unlawful." Part Two of Section Six,
Chapter 76, which deals with Burglary, Burglary of a Vehicle,
and Criminal Trespass, a necessary element of each of which
-6-
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definition, too, renders use of the word nunlawful" surplusage
to a degree, such a definition is logical in light of its use
throughout the criminal code.

In any case, as unfortunate as

it is that the Legislature has not provided a statutory
definition of the word "unlawful," the respondent submits that
the inferences drawn by the aopellant from the absence of a
definition are erroneous.
Even assuming that the appellant's logic that
definition of the word "unlawful" can be drawn by reference to
the statute in which the word appears is correct,

is either "unlawfully" remaining or entering on property,
gives the following definition:
(3) A person "enters or remains
unlawfully" in or upon premises when the
premises or any portion thereof at the
time of the entry or remaining are not
open to the public and when the actor is
not otherwise li~ensed or privileged to
enter or remain on the premises or such
portion thereof (Emphasis added).
Utah Code Ann., § 76-6-201(3). Significantly, while
kidnapping does not require that the act be "unlawful," Utah
Code Ann., § 76-5-301(1) requires as an element that the act
be •without authority of law." Custodial Interference, which
also does not require "unlawful" conduct, does require, in
Utah Code Ann., § 76-5-303(1), that the act be "without good
cause." The crime of Rape, which also does not require an
•unlawful" act, requires that the act be without the victim's
consent. See Utah Code Ann., S 76-5-402 (1) (1953), as
amended. Utah Code Ann., S 76-5-102(a) (1953), as amended,
defines an assault as "an attempt, with unlawful force or
violence, to do bodily injury to another." From this
definition it may be implied that lawful, or justified force
may be used to do bodily injury to another. Reference to Utah
Code Ann., § 76-2-401, et seq., explains the circumstances
under which such force is justified, or "lawful." Thus, read
in light of the other statutes referred to above, the logic of
the respondent's interpretation is further shown.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the appellant's assertion that the elements of the crime of
Arson should be incorporated into the requirements of
Aggravated Arson does not logically follow.

Indeed, if the

appellant's position is adopted, the definition of the word
"unlawful" in the Aggravated Arson statute can be drawn from
reference to the elements of that crime as set out in that
statute.

Reference to any other statute, including the Arson

statute, would be unnecessary.

In fact, it would make no more

sense to adopt the definition of "unlawful" as used in the
Arson statute to define the same word in the Aggravated Arson
statute than it would to adopt a different definition of the
word as it would be used in any of the other statutes in which
it is found.
The appellant's tenuous argument that adoption of
the defense that an owner q?nnot be convicted of Aggravated
Arson by torching his own property must be "incorporated" as a
defense to Aggravated Arson through his interpretation of the
word "unlawful" falls of its own weight. The simple fact that
the Legislature set out separate elements for each crime
inveighs heavily against such an assertion.

Had the

Legislature intended the result propounded by the appellant,
it would have spelled out specifically in the Aggravated Arson
statute the requirement that for a defendant to be found
guilty under its provisions, the property burned need be "that
of another."

It dio not do so.

The appellant's
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•incorporation" theory, then, goes not only against common
sense, but also is inconsistent with the notion that the
Legislature spells out what it intends to enact in legislation
it passes.
Whether the appellant is seen as an "owner" of the
burned property,3 or whether the "agency" shield from
liability proposed by the appellant (neither theory of which
was proved at trial) is seen as giving the appellant "owner"
status, he would not be immune from prosecution or a finding
of guilt under the Aggravated Arson statute.

An owner of a

habitable structure or any structure or vehicle in which any
other person is present at the time of a fire may be guilty of
Aggravated Arson if he causes the fire.
intention of the Legislature.

Such is the clear

Such is the language of the

Aggravated Arson statute. :
The Kansas cases cited by the appellant, State v.
Christendon, Kan., 468 P.2d 153

~1970);

State v. Parrish,

Kan., 468 P.2d 143 (1970); and State v. Parrish, Kan., 468
P.2d 150 (1970), are inapposite in this case.

Although the

Kansas Supreme Court applied the "agency" theory as set out by
the appellant in his brief and held that the "agent" of an
owner of burned property could not be held any more liable
than the owner himself for the crime of first-degree Arson,

3The fact that the appellant resided in the burned
structure could be seen as giving him a "possessory interest"
in the house sufficient to be an "owner" of the property. See
§ 76-6-101(3), supra.
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the court's finding that an owner of property could not be
found guilty of that crime was based on a Kansas statute which
specifically required as an element of the crime that the
property burned be that of another person.

The statute under

which the defendant in that case was prosecuted, Kansas
Statutes Ann.,

§

21-581, provided:

That any person who willfully sets
fire to or burns or causes to be burned,
or who aids, counsels or procures the
burning of any dwelling house, whether
occupied, unoccupied or vacant, or any
kitchen, shop, barn, stable or other
outhouse that is parcel thereof, or
belonging to or adjoining thereto, such
property being the eroperty of anot~
person, shall be guilty of arson in the
first degree, and upon conviction shall be
punished by confinement and hard labor for
not less than two nor more than twenty
years (Emphasis added).
As has been emphasized above, unlike the Kansas first-degree
Arson statute, the Utah Agcµ-avated Arson statute contains no
ownership requirement for a finding of guilt.

To the degree

that the Kansas statute requires a finding of ownership of the
burned property, both it and any cases decided under it are
inapplicable in Utah.
CONCLUSION
The appellant concedes that the Utah Legislature has
adopted a policy that burning any structure or vehicle when a
person is inside will subject the actor who burns the
structure or vehicle guilty of Aggravated Arson, regardless
-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of ownership of the property.

see appellant's brief, page 7.

His argument that that policy does not extend to the burning
of •any habitable structure" if that habitable structure is
owned by the actor is illogical and meritless.

The

Legislature's intent that an actor may be guilty of Aggravated
Arson by burning his own habitable structure is plain from the
words of the Aggravated Arson statute.
It was proved at trial that the appellant did in
fact intentionally and unlawfully burn a habitable structure.
This justifies the trial court's finding of guilt of
Aggravated Arson.

For that reason and the other reasons set

out above, the trial court's finding should be affirmed by
this Court.
Respectfully submitted this 21st day of September,
1982.
DAVlD L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

~-r-:.--::.~~
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed three true and exact
copies of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to Nancy
Bergeson, Attorney for Appellant, Salt Lake Legal Defender
Association, 333 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111,
this 21st day of September, 1982.
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